462 citations · 590 across the 28 of their papers we have counts for
29 papers
Multi Choice Min Prophet
Yossi Azar, Itamar Biran, Amos Fiat
We study the minimization counterpart of the classic prophet inequality, often termed the min prophet or cost prophet inequality. Unlike the maximization setting, where simple thre…
Epistemic Pairwise Maximin Share
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Yael Nissan +1
We introduce epistemic pairwise maximin share (EPMMS), a new fairness notion for fair division of indivisible goods. Two fundamental notions in this setting are envy-freeness up to…
Fair Division via Resource Augmentation
Hannaneh Akrami, Siddharth Barman, Alon Eden +5
We introduce and formalize the notion of resource augmentation for maximin share (MMS) fairness for the allocation of indivisible goods. Given an instance with agents and g…
Mechanism Design Without Disclosure: Committing to and Running Hidden Mechanisms
Ran Canetti, Amos Fiat, Yannai A. Gonczarowski
A central tenet in mechanism design is the ability to irrevocably commit to a mechanism. Commitment is achieved by public declaration, letting players verify incentive properties i…
An -regret analysis of Adversarial Bilateral Trade
Yossi Azar, Amos Fiat, Federico Fusco
We study sequential bilateral trade where sellers and buyers valuations are completely arbitrary (i.e., determined by an adversary). Sellers and buyers are strategic agents with pr…
Competitive Equilibria with Unequal Budgets: Supporting Arbitrary Pareto Optimal Allocations
Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat +1
We consider a market setting of agents with additive valuations over heterogeneous divisible resources. Agents are assigned a budget of tokens (possibly unequal budgets) they can u…