3 papers
cs.GT2025
Persuasion Gains and Losses from Peer Communication
Toygar T. Kerman, Anastas P. Tenev, Konstantin Zabarnyi
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting in which a sender wants to persuade a critical mass of receivers by revealing partial information about the state to them. The homogeneous bi…
cs.GT2024
Algorithmic Cheap Talk
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
The literature on strategic communication originated with the influential cheap talk model, which precedes the Bayesian persuasion model by three decades. This model describes an i…
cs.GT2024
Information Design in the Principal-Agent Problem
Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu +1
We study a variant of the principal-agent problem in which the principal does not directly observe the agent's effort outcome; rather, she gets a signal about the agent's action ac…