4 papers
How to Beat FCFS
Itai Ashlagi, Joseph Root
We study two observable queues with identical service rates, serving agents who arrive stochastically over time. Agents join the queue that minimizes their expected waiting time. A…
Stable Matching as Transport: a Welfarist Perspective on Market Design
Federico Echenique, Joseph Root, Fedor Sandomirskiy
This paper links matching markets with aligned preferences to optimal transport theory. We show that stability, efficiency, and fairness emerge as solutions to a parametric family…
A Theory of Network Games Part 1: Utility Representations
Joseph Root, Evan Sadler
We provide interpretable axiomatic foundations for utilities used in network games and identify several principled generalizations. First, we demonstrate that a ubiquitous feature…
Incentives and Efficiency in Constrained Allocation Mechanisms
Joseph Root, David S. Ahn
We study private-good allocation under general constraints. Several prominent examples are special cases, including house allocation, roommate matching, social choice, and multiple…