5 papers
How to Beat FCFS
Itai Ashlagi, Joseph Root
We study two observable queues with identical service rates, serving agents who arrive stochastically over time. Agents join the queue that minimizes their expected waiting time. A…
Auction Design with a Bit of Information
Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Shahr Dobzinski Jacob D. Leshno +2
Consider a revenue-maximizing seller who can access a binary signal about two bidders` joint values. We explore what kind of information is most valuable to the seller by studying…
From signaling to interviews in random matching markets
Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi, Amin Saberi +1
In many two-sided labor markets, interviews are conducted before matches are formed. The growing number of interviews in medical residency markets has increased demand for signalin…
The Power of Two in Token Systems
Itai Ashlagi, Süleyman Kerimov, Omer Tamuz +1
In economies without monetary transfers, token systems serve as an alternative to sustain cooperation, alleviate free riding, and increase efficiency. This paper studies whether a…
Stable Matching with Interviews
Itai Ashlagi, Jiale Chen, Mohammad Roghani +1
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in m…