activity
20142024
most citedOver-representation of Extreme Events in Decision-Making: A Rational Metacognitive Account

7 citations · 15 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

12 papers

cs.CL2024★ 2 cited

Text Understanding in GPT-4 vs Humans

Thomas R. Shultz, Jamie M. Wise, Ardavan Salehi Nobandegani

We examine whether a leading AI system GPT4 understands text as well as humans do, first using a well-established standardized test of discourse comprehension. On this test, GPT4 p…

cs.AI2023★ 1 cited

Towards Machines that Trust: AI Agents Learn to Trust in the Trust Game

Ardavan S. Nobandegani, Irina Rish, Thomas R. Shultz

Widely considered a cornerstone of human morality, trust shapes many aspects of human social interactions. In this work, we present a theoretical analysis of the $\textit{trust gam…

q-bio.NC2022

A Neural Model of Number Comparison with Surprisingly Robust Generalization

Thomas R. Shultz, Ardavan S. Nobandegani, Zilong Wang

We propose a relatively simple computational neural-network model of number comparison. Training on comparisons of the integers 1-9 enable the model to efficiently and accurately s…

cs.AI2022

Cognitive Models as Simulators: The Case of Moral Decision-Making

Ardavan S. Nobandegani, Thomas R. Shultz, Irina Rish

To achieve desirable performance, current AI systems often require huge amounts of training data. This is especially problematic in domains where collecting data is both expensive…

q-bio.NC2021

A Computational Model of Infant Learning and Reasoning with Probabilities

Thomas R Shultz, Ardavan S Nobandegani

Recent experiments reveal that 6- to 12-month-old infants can learn probabilities and reason with them. In this work, we present a novel computational system called Neural Probabil…

q-bio.NC2018

Bringing Order to the Cognitive Fallacy Zoo

Ardavan S. Nobandegani, William Campoli, Thomas R. Shultz

In the eyes of a rationalist like Descartes or Spinoza, human reasoning is flawless, marching toward uncovering ultimate truth. A few centuries later, however, culminating in the w…

cs.AI2018★ 1 cited

A Rational Distributed Process-level Account of Independence Judgment

Ardavan S. Nobandegani, Ioannis N. Psaromiligkos

It is inconceivable how chaotic the world would look to humans, faced with innumerable decisions a day to be made under uncertainty, had they been lacking the capacity to distingui…

q-bio.NC2018★ 7 cited

Over-representation of Extreme Events in Decision-Making: A Rational Metacognitive Account

Ardavan S. Nobandegani, Kevin da Silva Castanheira, A. Ross Otto +1

The Availability bias, manifested in the over-representation of extreme eventualities in decision-making, is a well-known cognitive bias, and is generally taken as evidence of huma…

cs.AI2017★ 1 cited

The Causal Frame Problem: An Algorithmic Perspective

Ardavan Salehi Nobandegani, Ioannis N. Psaromiligkos

The Frame Problem (FP) is a puzzle in philosophy of mind and epistemology, articulated by the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as follows: "How do we account for our apparent ab…

q-bio.NC2017★ 2 cited

Converting Cascade-Correlation Neural Nets into Probabilistic Generative Models

Ardavan Salehi Nobandegani, Thomas R. Shultz

Humans are not only adept in recognizing what class an input instance belongs to (i.e., classification task), but perhaps more remarkably, they can imagine (i.e., generate) plausib…

cs.AI2015

Probabilistic Structural Controllability in Causal Bayesian Networks

Ardavan Salehi Nobandegani, Ioannis N. Psaromiligkos

Humans routinely confront the following key question which could be viewed as a probabilistic variant of the controllability problem: While faced with an uncertain environment gove…

cs.AI2014★ 1 cited

Multi-Context Models for Reasoning under Partial Knowledge: Generative Process and Inference Grammar

Ardavan Salehi Nobandegani, Ioannis N. Psaromiligkos

Arriving at the complete probabilistic knowledge of a domain, i.e., learning how all variables interact, is indeed a demanding task. In reality, settings often arise for which an i…