5 citations · 12 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers · 1 filter
Constant Inapproximability for Fisher Markets
Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Alexandros Hollender +1
We study the problem of computing approximate market equilibria in Fisher markets with separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions. In this setting, the problem was…
Fisher Markets with Approximately Optimal Bundles and the Need for a PCP Theorem for PPAD
Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Alexandros Hollender +1
We study the problem of computing a competitive equilibrium with approximately optimal bundles in Fisher markets with separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions, m…
Online EFX Allocations with Predictions
Themistoklis Melissourgos, Nicos Protopapas
We study an online fair division problem where a fixed number of goods arrive sequentially and must be allocated to a given set of agents. Once a good arrives, its true value for e…
Multi-Agent Systems for Computational Economics and Finance
Michael Kampouridis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou +2
In this article we survey the main research topics of our group at the University of Essex. Our research interests lie at the intersection of theoretical computer science, artifici…
Tight Inapproximability for Graphical Games
Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Alexandros Hollender +1
We provide a complete characterization for the computational complexity of finding approximate equilibria in two-action graphical games. We consider the two most well-studied appro…
Walrasian Equilibria in Markets with Small Demands
Argyrios Deligkas, Themistoklis Melissourgos, Paul G. Spirakis
We study the complexity of finding a Walrasian equilibrium in markets where the agents have -demand valuations. These valuations are an extension of unit-demand valuations where…
Connected Subgraph Defense Games
Eleni C. Akrida, Argyrios Deligkas, Themistoklis Melissourgos +1
We study a security game over a network played between a and . Every attacker chooses, probabilistically, a node of the network to damage. The defender ch…
Strategic Contention Resolution in Multiple Channels
George Christodoulou, Themistoklis Melissourgos, Paul G. Spirakis
We consider the problem of resolving contention in communication networks with selfish users. In a \textit{contention game} each of identical players has a single inform…