57 citations · 276 across the 18 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers · 1 filter
Context-sensitive norm enforcement reduces sanctioning costs in spatial public goods games
Hsuan-Wei Lee, Colin Cleveland, Attila Szolnoki
Uniform punishment policies can sustain cooperation in social dilemmas but impose severe costs on enforcers, creating a second-order free-rider problem that undermines the very mec…
Suppressing defection by increasing temptation: the impact of smart cooperators on a social dilemma situation
Hsuan-Wei Lee, Colin Cleveland, Attila Szolnoki
In a social dilemma situation, where individual and collective interests are in conflict, it sounds a reasonable assumption that the presence of super or smart players, who simulta…
Supporting punishment via taxation in a structured population
Hsuan-Wei Lee, Colin Cleveland, Attila Szolnoki
Taxes are an essential and uniformly applied institution for maintaining modern societies. However, the levels of taxation remain an intensive debate topic among citizens. If each…
Restoring spatial cooperation with myopic agents in a three-strategy social dilemma
Hsuan-Wei Lee, Colin Cleveland, Attila Szolnoki
Introducing strategy complexity into the basic conflict of cooperation and defection is a natural response to avoid the tragedy of the common state. As an intermediate approach, qu…
Group-size dependent synergy in heterogeneous populations
Hsuan-Wei Lee, Colin Cleveland, Attila Szolnoki
When people collaborate, they expect more in return than a simple sum of their efforts. This observation is at the heart of the so-called public goods game, where the participants'…
When costly migration helps to improve cooperation
Hsuan-Wei Lee, Colin Cleveland, Attila Szolnoki
Motion is a typical reaction among animals and humans trying to reach better conditions in a changing world. This aspect has been studied intensively in social dilemmas where compe…
Mercenary punishment in structured populations
Hsuan-Wei Lee, Colin Cleveland, Attila Szolnoki
Punishing those who refuse to participate in common efforts is a known and intensively studied way to maintain cooperation among self-interested agents. But this act is costly, hen…
Small Fraction of Selective Cooperators Can Elevate General Wellbeing Significantly
Hsuan-Wei Lee, Colin Cleveland, Attila Szolnoki
A cooperative player invests effort into a common venture without knowing the partner's intention in advance. But this strategy can be implemented in various ways when a player is…
Social Clustering in Epidemic Spread on Coevolving Networks
Hsuan-Wei Lee, Nishant Malik, Feng Shi +1
Even though transitivity is a central structural feature of social networks, its influence on epidemic spread on coevolving networks has remained relatively unexplored. Here we int…