47 citations · 76 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
CTRL-ALT-LED: Leaking Data from Air-Gapped Computers via Keyboard LEDs
Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Dima Bykhovsky +1
Using the keyboard LEDs to send data optically was proposed in 2002 by Loughry and Umphress [1] (Appendix A). In this paper we extensively explore this threat in the context of a m…
PowerHammer: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Computers through Power Lines
Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Dima Bykhovsky +1
In this paper we provide an implementation, evaluation, and analysis of PowerHammer, a malware (bridgeware [1]) that uses power lines to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers.…
ODINI : Escaping Sensitive Data from Faraday-Caged, Air-Gapped Computers via Magnetic Fields
Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Andrey Daidakulov +1
Air-gapped computers are computers which are kept isolated from the Internet, because they store and process sensitive information. When highly sensitive data is involved, an air-g…
xLED: Covert Data Exfiltration from Air-Gapped Networks via Router LEDs
Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Andrey Daidakulov +1
In this paper we show how attackers can covertly leak data (e.g., encryption keys, passwords and files) from highly secure or air-gapped networks via the row of status LEDs that ex…
LED-it-GO: Leaking (a lot of) Data from Air-Gapped Computers via the (small) Hard Drive LED
Mordechai Guri, Boris Zadov, Eran Atias +1
In this paper we present a method which allows attackers to covertly leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers. Our method utilizes the hard disk drive (HDD) activity LED which…