1 citations · 1 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
Showing cs.GTShow all
2 papers · 1 filter
cs.GT2017★ 1 cited
Simple vs Optimal Mechanisms in Auctions with Convex Payments
Amy Greenwald, Takehiro Oyakawa, Vasilis Syrgkanis
We investigate approximately optimal mechanisms in settings where bidders' utility functions are non-linear; specifically, convex, with respect to payments (such settings arise, fo…
cs.GT2016
Optimal Auctions with Convex Perceived Payments
Amy Greenwald, Takehiro Oyakawa, Vasilis Syrgkanis
Myerson derived a simple and elegant solution to the single-parameter revenue-maximization problem in his seminal work on optimal auction design assuming the usual model of quasi-l…