3 papers
math.OC2023
The value of the information in the Moral Hazard setting
Ishak Hajjej, Caroline Hillairet, Mohamed Mnif
This article studies the problem of evaluating the information that a Principal lacks when establishing an incentive contract with an Agent whose effort is not observable. The Prin…
math.PR2019
Optimal stopping contract for Public Private Partnerships under moral hazard
Ishak Hajjej, Caroline Hillairet, Mohamed Mnif
This paper studies optimal Public Private Partnerships contract between a public entity and a consortium, in continuous-time and with a continuous payment, with the possibility for…
math.OC2017
Optimal Contract with Moral Hazard for Public Private Partnerships
Ishak Hajjej, Caroline Hillairet, Mohamed Mnif +1
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is a contract between a public entity and a consortium, in which the public outsources the construction and the maintenance of an equipment (hospit…