12 citations · 21 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers
Commitment Attacks on Ethereum's Reward Mechanism
Roozbeh Sarenche, Ertem Nusret Tas, Barnabe Monnot +2
Validators in permissionless, large-scale blockchains, such as Ethereum, are typically payoff-maximizing, rational actors. Ethereum relies on in-protocol incentives, like rewards f…
Cooperative AI via Decentralized Commitment Devices
Xinyuan Sun, Davide Crapis, Matt Stephenson +3
Credible commitment devices have been a popular approach for robust multi-agent coordination. However, existing commitment mechanisms face limitations like privacy, integrity, and…
Time is Money: Strategic Timing Games in Proof-of-Stake Protocols
Caspar Schwarz-Schilling, Fahad Saleh, Thomas Thiery +3
We propose a model suggesting that honest-but-rational consensus participants may play timing games, and strategically delay their block proposal to optimize MEV capture, while sti…
Optimality Despite Chaos in Fee Markets
Stefanos Leonardos, Daniël Reijsbergen, Barnabé Monnot +1
Transaction fee markets are essential components of blockchain economies, as they resolve the inherent scarcity in the number of transactions that can be added to each block. In ea…
A Blockchain-Based Approach for Collaborative Formalization of Mathematics and Programs
Jin Xing Lim, Barnabé Monnot, Shaowei Lin +1
Formalization of mathematics is the process of digitizing mathematical knowledge, which allows for formal proof verification as well as efficient semantic searches. Given the large…
Three Attacks on Proof-of-Stake Ethereum
Caspar Schwarz-Schilling, Joachim Neu, Barnabé Monnot +3
Recently, two attacks were presented against Proof-of-Stake (PoS) Ethereum: one where short-range reorganizations of the underlying consensus chain are used to increase individual…