11 citations · 30 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions
Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan
In their seminal paper that initiated the field of algorithmic mechanism design, \citet{NR99} studied the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for scheduling jobs on unrel…
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location
Priyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis +2
In this work we introduce an alternative model for the design and analysis of strategyproof mechanisms that is motivated by the recent surge of work in "learning-augmented algorith…
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions
Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis +2
We revisit the well-studied problem of budget-feasible procurement, where a buyer with a strict budget constraint seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic providers (the…
Dynamic First Price Auctions Robust to Heterogeneous Buyers
Shipra Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vahab Mirrokni +1
We study dynamic mechanisms for optimizing revenue in repeated auctions, that are robust to heterogeneous forward-looking and learning behavior of the buyers. Typically it is assum…
On the Construction of Substitutes
Eric Balkanski, Renato Paes Leme
Gross substitutability is a central concept in Economics and is connected to important notions in Discrete Convex Analysis, Number Theory and the analysis of Greedy algorithms in C…
Statistical Cost Sharing
Eric Balkanski, Umar Syed, Sergei Vassilvitskii
We study the cost sharing problem for cooperative games in situations where the cost function is not available via oracle queries, but must instead be derived from data, repres…