25 citations · 124 across the 24 of their papers we have counts for
18 papers · 1 filter
Reward Schemes and Committee Sizes in Proof of Stake Governance
Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos, Evangelos Markakis +1
In this paper, we investigate the impact of reward schemes and committee sizes motivated by governance systems over blockchain communities. We introduce a model for elections with…
Single-token vs Two-token Blockchain Tokenomics
Aggelos Kiayias, Philip Lazos, Paolo Penna
We study long-term equilibria that arise in the token monetary policy, or tokenomics, design of proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain systems that engage utility maximizing users and val…
On the Potential and Limitations of Proxy Voting: Delegation with Incomplete Votes
Georgios Amanatidis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Philip Lazos +2
We study elections where voters are faced with the challenge of expressing preferences over an extreme number of issues under consideration. This is largely motivated by emerging b…
Optimal Testing and Containment Strategies for Universities in Mexico amid COVID-19
Luis Benavides-Vázquez, Héctor Alonso Guzmán-Gutiérrez, Jakob Jonnerby +5
This work sets out a testing and containment framework developed for reopening universities in Mexico following the lockdown due to COVID-19. We treat diagnostic testing as a resou…
Tiered Mechanisms for Blockchain Transaction Fees
Aggelos Kiayias, Elias Koutsoupias, Philip Lazos +1
Blockchain systems come with the promise of being inclusive for a variety of decentralized applications (DApps) that can serve different purposes and have different urgency require…
Round-Robin Beyond Additive Agents: Existence and Fairness of Approximate Equilibria
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos +2
Fair allocation of indivisible goods has attracted extensive attention over the last two decades, yielding numerous elegant algorithmic results and producing challenging open quest…
Decentralised Update Selection with Semi-Strategic Experts
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Philip Lazos +1
Motivated by governance models adopted in blockchain applications, we study the problem of selecting appropriate system updates in a decentralised way. Contrary to most existing vo…
Parallel Contests for Crowdsourcing Reviews: Existence and Quality of Equilibria
Georgios Birmpas, Lyudmila Kovalchuk, Philip Lazos +1
Motivated by the intricacies of allocating treasury funds in blockchain settings, we study the problem of crowdsourcing reviews for many different proposals, in parallel. During th…
Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness
Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Federico Fusco +3
We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefo…
On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender +2
We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when b…
RPPLNS: Pay-per-last-N-shares with a Randomised Twist
Philip Lazos, Francisco J. Marmolejo-Cossío, Xinyu Zhou +1
"Pay-per-last--shares" (PPLNS) is one of the most common payout strategies used by mining pools in Proof-of-Work (PoW) cryptocurrencies. As with any payment scheme, it is impera…
Efficient Two-Sided Markets with Limited Information
Paul Dütting, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos +2
A celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that any truthful mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resu…
Pandora's Box Problem with Order Constraints
Shant Boodaghians, Federico Fusco, Philip Lazos +1
The Pandora's Box Problem, originally formalized by Weitzman in 1979, models selection from set of random, alternative options, when evaluation is costly. This includes, for exampl…
Blockchain Mining Games with Pay Forward
Elias Koutsoupias, Philip Lazos, Paolo Serafino +1
We study the strategic implications that arise from adding one extra option to the miners participating in the bitcoin protocol. We propose that when adding a block, miners also ha…
Online Trading as a Secretary Problem
Elias Koutsoupias, Philip Lazos
We consider the online problem in which an intermediary trades identical items with a sequence of n buyers and n sellers, each of unit demand. We assume that the values of the trad…
Multi-unit Bilateral Trade
Matthias Gerstgrasser, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart de Keijzer +2
We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilat…
The Pareto Frontier of Inefficiency in Mechanism Design
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Philip Lazos
We study the trade-off between the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS) in mechanism design, in the prototypical problem of unrelated machine scheduling. We give…
Online Market Intermediation
Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Elias Koutsoupias, Philip Lazos
We study a dynamic market setting where an intermediary interacts with an unknown large sequence of agents that can be either sellers or buyers: their identities, as well as the se…