69 citations · 428 across the 27 of their papers we have counts for
28 papers
Dynamic Frequency-Based Fingerprinting Attacks against Modern Sandbox Environments
Debopriya Roy Dipta, Thore Tiemann, Berk Gulmezoglu +2
The cloud computing landscape has evolved significantly in recent years, embracing various sandboxes to meet the diverse demands of modern cloud applications. These sandboxes encom…
Okapi: Efficiently Safeguarding Speculative Data Accesses in Sandboxed Environments
Philipp Schmitz, Tobias Jauch, Alex Wezel +6
This paper introduces Okapi, a new hardware/software cross-layer architecture designed to mitigate Transient Execution Side Channel attacks, including Spectre variants, in modern c…
Microarchitectural Security of AWS Firecracker VMM for Serverless Cloud Platforms
Zane Weissman, Thore Tiemann, Thomas Eisenbarth +1
Firecracker is a virtual machine manager (VMM) built by Amazon Web Services (AWS) for serverless cloud platforms, services that run code for end users on a per-task basis, automati…
SEV-Step: A Single-Stepping Framework for AMD-SEV
Luca Wilke, Jan Wichelmann, Anja Rabich +1
The ever increasing popularity and availability of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) had a stark influence on microarchitectural attack research in academia, as their strong at…
Madvex: Instrumentation-based Adversarial Attacks on Machine Learning Malware Detection
Nils Loose, Felix Mächtle, Claudius Pott +2
WebAssembly (Wasm) is a low-level binary format for web applications, which has found widespread adoption due to its improved performance and compatibility with existing software.…
MAMBO-V: Dynamic Side-Channel Leakage Analysis on RISC-V
Jan Wichelmann, Christopher Peredy, Florian Sieck +2
RISC-V is an emerging technology, with applications ranging from embedded devices to high-performance servers. Therefore, more and more security-critical workloads will be conducte…
Dash: Accelerating Distributed Private Convolutional Neural Network Inference with Arithmetic Garbled Circuits
Jonas Sander, Sebastian Berndt, Ida Bruhns +1
The adoption of machine learning solutions is rapidly increasing across all parts of society. As the models grow larger, both training and inference of machine learning models is i…
Cipherfix: Mitigating Ciphertext Side-Channel Attacks in Software
Jan Wichelmann, Anna Pätschke, Luca Wilke +1
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide an environment for running workloads in the cloud without having to trust cloud service providers, by offering additional hardware-ass…
Microwalk-CI: Practical Side-Channel Analysis for JavaScript Applications
Jan Wichelmann, Florian Sieck, Anna Pätschke +1
Secret-dependent timing behavior in cryptographic implementations has resulted in exploitable vulnerabilities, undermining their security. Over the years, numerous tools to automat…
IOTLB-SC: An Accelerator-Independent Leakage Source in Modern Cloud Systems
Thore Tiemann, Zane Weissman, Thomas Eisenbarth +1
Hardware peripherals such as GPUs and FPGAs are commonly available in server-grade computing to accelerate specific compute tasks, from database queries to machine learning. CSPs h…
Util::Lookup: Exploiting key decoding in cryptographic libraries
Florian Sieck, Sebastian Berndt, Jan Wichelmann +1
Implementations of cryptographic libraries have been scrutinized for secret-dependent execution behavior exploitable by microarchitectural side-channel attacks. To prevent unintend…
undeSErVed trust: Exploiting Permutation-Agnostic Remote Attestation
Luca Wilke, Jan Wichelmann, Florian Sieck +1
The ongoing trend of moving data and computation to the cloud is met with concerns regarding privacy and protection of intellectual property. Cloud Service Providers (CSP) must be…
CACHE SNIPER : Accurate timing control of cache evictions
Samira Briongos, Ida Bruhns, Pedro Malagón +2
Microarchitectural side channel attacks have been very prominent in security research over the last few years. Caches have been an outstanding covert channel, as they provide high…
SEVurity: No Security Without Integrity -- Breaking Integrity-Free Memory Encryption with Minimal Assumptions
Luca Wilke, Jan Wichelmann, Mathias Morbitzer +1
One reason for not adopting cloud services is the required trust in the cloud provider: As they control the hypervisor, any data processed in the system is accessible to them. Full…
JackHammer: Efficient Rowhammer on Heterogeneous FPGA-CPU Platforms
Zane Weissman, Thore Tiemann, Daniel Moghimi +3
After years of development, FPGAs are finally making an appearance on multi-tenant cloud servers. These heterogeneous FPGA-CPU architectures break common assumptions about isolatio…
TPM-FAIL: TPM meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
Daniel Moghimi, Berk Sunar, Thomas Eisenbarth +1
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) serves as a hardware-based root of trust that protects cryptographic keys from privileged system and physical adversaries. In this work, we perform a…
FortuneTeller: Predicting Microarchitectural Attacks via Unsupervised Deep Learning
Berk Gulmezoglu, Ahmad Moghimi, Thomas Eisenbarth +1
The growing security threat of microarchitectural attacks underlines the importance of robust security sensors and detection mechanisms at the hardware level. While there are studi…
RELOAD+REFRESH: Abusing Cache Replacement Policies to Perform Stealthy Cache Attacks
Samira Briongos, Pedro Malagón, José M. Moya +1
Caches have become the prime method for unintended information extraction across logical isolation boundaries. Even Spectre and Meltdown rely on the cache side channel, as it provi…
SPOILER: Speculative Load Hazards Boost Rowhammer and Cache Attacks
Saad Islam, Ahmad Moghimi, Ida Bruhns +4
Modern microarchitectures incorporate optimization techniques such as speculative loads and store forwarding to improve the memory bottleneck. The processor executes the load specu…
Undermining User Privacy on Mobile Devices Using AI
Berk Gulmezoglu, Andreas Zankl, M. Caner Tol +3
Over the past years, literature has shown that attacks exploiting the microarchitecture of modern processors pose a serious threat to the privacy of mobile phone users. This is bec…
MicroWalk: A Framework for Finding Side Channels in Binaries
Jan Wichelmann, Ahmad Moghimi, Thomas Eisenbarth +1
Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process and ste…
DeepCloak: Adversarial Crafting As a Defensive Measure to Cloak Processes
Mehmet Sinan Inci, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar
Over the past decade, side-channels have proven to be significant and practical threats to modern computing systems. Recent attacks have all exploited the underlying shared hardwar…
MemJam: A False Dependency Attack against Constant-Time Crypto Implementations
Ahmad Moghimi, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar
Cache attacks exploit memory access patterns of cryptographic implementations. Constant-Time implementation techniques have become an indispensable tool in fighting cache timing at…
CacheShield: Protecting Legacy Processes Against Cache Attacks
Samira Briongos, Gorka Irazoqui, Pedro Malagón +1
Cache attacks pose a threat to any code whose execution flow or memory accesses depend on sensitive information. Especially in public clouds, where caches are shared across several…