5 citations · 9 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
Moore's Greedy Algorithm for Minimizing the Number of Late Jobs: Structure and Implementation
Dean Matthew Menezes, C. Gregory Plaxton
Scheduling jobs with deadlines and processing times on a single resource to minimize late jobs equates to finding a maximum-cardinality feasible subset. Moore (1968) proposed a…
Hospitals/Residents with Inseparable Couples: Finding a Coalition-Stable Assignment Is NP-Hard
Zeyuan Hu, C. Gregory Plaxton
In recent work on course allocation, Rodríguez and Manlove consider the complexity of finding a stable assignment under four notions of stability, including two coalitional notions…
Constant-Approximate and Constant-Strategyproof Two-Facility Location
Elijah Journey Fullerton, Zeyuan Hu, C. Gregory Plaxton
We study deterministic mechanisms for the two-facility location problem. Given the reported locations of n agents on the real line, such a mechanism specifies where to build the tw…
The Obnoxious Facility Location Game with Dichotomous Preferences
Fu Li, C. Gregory Plaxton, Vaibhav B. Sinha
We consider a facility location game in which agents reside at known locations on a path, and heterogeneous facilities are to be constructed on the path. Each agent is adve…
Egalitarian Resource Sharing Over Multiple Rounds
Fu Li, C. Gregory Plaxton, Vaibhav B. Sinha
It is often beneficial for agents to pool their resources in order to better accommodate fluctuations in individual demand. Many multi-round resource allocation mechanisms operate…
Object Allocation Over a Network of Objects: Mobile Agents with Strict Preferences
Fu Li, C. Gregory Plaxton, Vaibhav B. Sinha
In recent work, Gourvès, Lesca, and Wilczynski propose a variant of the classic housing markets model where the matching between agents and objects evolves through Pareto-improving…