5 citations · 6 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
cs.GT2019
On the Existence of Three-Dimensional Stable Matchings with Cyclic Preferences
Chi-Kit Lam, C. Gregory Plaxton
We study the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. This model involves three types of agents, with an equal number of agents of each type. The types fo…
cs.GT2017★ 5 cited
Group Strategyproof Pareto-Stable Marriage with Indifferences via the Generalized Assignment Game
Nevzat Onur Domaniç, Chi-Kit Lam, C. Gregory Plaxton
We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable…
cs.GT2017★ 1 cited
Strategyproof Pareto-Stable Mechanisms for Two-Sided Matching with Indifferences
Nevzat Onur Domaniç, Chi-Kit Lam, C. Gregory Plaxton
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the m…