3 papers
cs.DS2026
The Knapsack Secretary Problem is Strictly Harder Than the Secretary Problem
Eric Balkanski, Jason Chatzitheodorou, Dimitris Fotakis +1
The knapsack secretary problem is a generalization of the classical secretary problem where the accepted items must satisfy a knapsack constraint. A line of work has developed cons…
cs.GT2026
A Unified Framework for Uniform-Price Resource Allocation Mechanisms
Ioannis Caragiannis, Dimitris Fotakis, Stratis Skoulakis
Mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource among strategic agents have been widely studied. The prominent paradigm is the proportional (Kelly) mechanism, which elicits a scalar…
cs.GT2026
Repeated Descent: A Framework for Online Budget-Feasible Auctions
Andreas Charalampopoulos, Dimitris Fotakis, Thanos Tolias
We study budget feasible procurement auctions, in which agents, each with a privately held service cost, offer their services to an employer. The employer seeks to maximize a p…