25 citations · 80 across the 30 of their papers we have counts for
32 papers · 1 filter
Contests to Incentivize a Target Group
Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul Goldberg
We study how to incentivize agents in a target group to produce a higher output in the context of incomplete information, by means of rank-order allocation contests. We describe a…
Contest Design with Threshold Objectives
Edith Elkind, Abheek Ghosh, Paul W. Goldberg
We study contests where the designer's objective is an extension of the widely studied objective of maximizing the total output: The designer gets zero marginal utility from a play…
Equivalence of Models of Cake-Cutting Protocols
Paul W. Goldberg, Ioana Iaru
The cake-cutting problem involves dividing a heterogeneous, divisible resource fairly between agents. Brânzei et al. [6] introduced {\em generalised cut and choose} (GCC) proto…
Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Games
Paul W. Goldberg, Matthew J. Katzman
Nearly a decade ago, Azrieli and Shmaya introduced the class of -Lipschitz games in which every player's payoff function is -Lipschitz with respect to the actions of the othe…
Consensus Halving for Sets of Items
Paul W. Goldberg, Alexandros Hollender, Ayumi Igarashi +2
Consensus halving refers to the problem of dividing a resource into two parts so that every agent values both parts equally. Prior work has shown that when the resource is represen…
Learning Strong Substitutes Demand via Queries
Paul W. Goldberg, Edwin Lock, Francisco Marmolejo-Cossío
This paper addresses the computational challenges of learning strong substitutes demand when given access to a demand (or valuation) oracle. Strong substitutes demand generalises t…