1 citations · 1 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2025
Roommates with Convex Preferences
Sophie Bade
Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roomma…
econ.TH2023
Royal Processions: Incentives, Efficiency and Fairness in Two-sided Matching
Sophie Bade, Joseph Root
We study the set of incentive compatible and efficient two-sided matching mechanisms. We classify all such mechanisms under an additional assumption -- "gender-neutrality" -- which…
cs.GT2016★ 1 cited
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness
Sophie Bade, Yannai A. Gonczarowski
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem holds that dictatorship is the only Pareto optimal and strategyproof social choice function on the full domain of preferences. Much…