6 papers · 1 filter
Network Allocation Games with Anonymous Preferences
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Å imon Schierreich +1
We study network allocation games in which a set of agents must be allocated to (a subset of) the vertices of a graph topology. The agents are anonymous and strategic: Each of them…
Stability in Distance Preservation Games on Graphs
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Tiger-Lily Goldsmith +2
We introduce a new class of network allocation games called graphical distance preservation games. Here, we are given a graph, called a topology, and a set of agents that need to b…
Dividing Indivisible Items for the Benefit of All: It is Hard to Be Fair Without Social Awareness
Argyris Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Tiger-Lily Goldsmith +2
In standard fair division models, we assume that all agents are selfish. However, in many scenarios, division of resources has a direct impact on the whole group or even society. T…
Mechanism Design with Outliers and Predictions
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Sophie Klumper +2
We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some a…
Balanced and Fair Partitioning of Friends
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Stavros D. Ioannidis +2
In the recently introduced model of fair partitioning of friends, there is a set of agents located on the vertices of an underlying graph that indicates the friendships between the…
The Complexity of Extending Fair Allocations of Indivisible Goods
Argyrios Deligkas, Eduard Eiben, Robert Ganian +2
We initiate the study of computing envy-free allocations of indivisible items in the extension setting, i.e., when some part of the allocation is fixed and the task is to allocate…