activity
20042026
most citedBeating 1-1/e for Ordered Prophets

61 citations · 329 across the 74 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators
Showing 2016 · cs.GTShow all

6 papers · 2 filters

cs.GT2016★ 1 cited

On-demand or Spot? Selling the cloud to risk-averse customers

Darrell Hoy, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier

In Amazon EC2, cloud resources are sold through a combination of an on-demand market, in which customers buy resources at a fixed price, and a spot market, in which customers bid f…

cs.GT2016

Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs

Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim +1

We present a general framework for stochastic online maximization problems with combinatorial feasibility constraints. The framework establishes prophet inequalities by constructin…

cs.GT2016

Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions

Rad Niazadeh, Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica +2

Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web ad…

cs.GT2016★ 1 cited

Procrastination with variable present bias

Nick Gravin, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier +1

Individuals working towards a goal often exhibit time inconsistent behavior, making plans and then failing to follow through. One well-known model of such behavioral anomalies is p…

cs.GT2016★ 12 cited

From Duels to Battefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games

AmirMahdi Ahmadinejad, Sina Dehghani, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi +3

We study the problem of computing Nash equilibria of zero-sum games. Many natural zero-sum games have exponentially many strategies, but highly structured payoffs. For example, in…

cs.GT2016

Correlated and Coarse equilibria of Single-item auctions

Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan

We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to alwa…