11 papers
The Tiered Clinching Auction with Applications to Carbon Offset Markets
Tessa Davis, Agnès Totschnig, Adrian Vetta
Voluntary carbon offsetting is a strategy which has been pursued globally by corporations to reduce their effective carbon emissions. Carbon offset markets currently suffer from lo…
Random Serial Dictatorship is -Envy-Free
Frank Connor, Max Dupré la Tour, Louis-Roy Langevin +4
We analyze the house allocation problem, in which a set of agents must be matched to a set of objects for which they have cardinal utilities. A central mechanism for this problem i…
Computing Thiele Rules on Interval Elections and their Generalizations
Dimitris Avramidis, Alexandra Lassota, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin +1
Approval-based committee voting has received significant attention in the social choice community. Among the studied rules, Thiele rules, and especially Proportional Approval Votin…
Cities at Play: Improving Equilibria in Urban Neighbourhood Games
Martin Gairing, Adrian Vetta, Zhanzhan Zhao
How should cities invest to improve social welfare when individuals respond strategically to local conditions? We model this question using a game-theoretic version of Schelling's…
A General Framework for a Class of Quarrels: The Quarrelling Paradox Revisited
Arash Abizadeh, Adrian Vetta
If a measure of voting power assigns players greater voting power because they no longer effectively cooperate, then it displays the quarrelling paradox and violates the quarrel po…
The Condorcet Dimension of Metric Spaces
Alexandra Lassota, Adrian Vetta, Bernhard von Stengel
A Condorcet winning set is a set of candidates such that no other candidate is preferred by at least half the voters over all members of the set. The Condorcet dimension, which is…