15 citations · 75 across the 31 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Constant Swap Regret in General-Sum Games via Two-Scale Higher-Order Optimism
Tung Mai
We give deterministic and uncoupled learning dynamics for finite multiplayer general-sum games under full-information feedback that achieve constant individual swap regret in self-…
Robust Stable Matchings: Dealing with Changes in Preferences
Rohith Reddy Gangam, Tung Mai, Nitya Raju +1
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances and on the same set…
Stability-Preserving, Time-Efficient Mechanisms for School Choice in Two Rounds
Karthik Gajulapalli, James Liu, Tung Mai +1
We address the following dynamic version of the school choice question: a city, named City, admits students in two temporally-separated rounds, denoted and $\mathca…
Nash Social Welfare for Indivisible Items under Separable, Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities
Nima Anari, Tung Mai, Shayan Oveis Gharan +1
Recently Cole and Gkatzelis gave the first constant factor approximation algorithm for the problem of allocating indivisible items to agents, under additive valuations, so as to ma…
A Performance-Based Scheme for Pricing Resources in the Cloud
Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani
With the rapid growth of the cloud computing marketplace, the issue of pricing resources in the cloud has been the subject of much study in recent years. In this paper, we identify…
Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare
Richard Cole, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vasilis Gkatzelis +4
We study Fisher markets and the problem of maximizing the Nash social welfare (NSW), and show several closely related new results. In particular, we obtain: -- A new integer progra…
New Convex Programs for Fisher's Market Model and its Generalizations
Nikhil R. Devanur, Kamal Jain, Tung Mai +2
We present the following results pertaining to Fisher's market model: -We give two natural generalizations of Fisher's market model: In model M_1, sellers can declare an upper boun…