326 citations · 381 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers
MAGE: Mutual Attestation for a Group of Enclaves without Trusted Third Parties
Guoxing Chen, Yinqian Zhang
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) local and remote attestation mechanisms enable an enclave to attest its identity (i.e., the enclave measurement, which is the cryptographic ha…
Stacco: Differentially Analyzing Side-Channel Traces for Detecting SSL/TLS Vulnerabilities in Secure Enclaves
Yuan Xiao, Mengyuan Li, Sanchuan Chen +1
Intel Software Guard Extension (SGX) offers software applications enclave to protect their confidentiality and integrity from malicious operating systems. The SSL/TLS protocol, whi…
Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX
Wenhao Wang, Guoxing Chen, Xiaorui Pan +5
Side-channel risks of Intel's SGX have recently attracted great attention. Under the spotlight is the newly discovered page-fault attack, in which an OS-level adversary induces pag…
A software approach to defeating side channels in last-level caches
Ziqiao Zhou, Michael K. Reiter, Yinqian Zhang
We present a software approach to mitigate access-driven side-channel attacks that leverage last-level caches (LLCs) shared across cores to leak information between security domain…