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Incentive-Compatible Selection Mechanisms for Forests
Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
Given a directed forest-graph, a probabilistic \emph{selection mechanism} is a probability distribution over the vertex set. A selection mechanism is \emph{incentive-compatible} (I…
Incentive-Compatible Classification
Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
We investigate the possibility of an incentive-compatible (IC, a.k.a. strategy-proof) mechanism for the classification of agents in a network according to their reviews of each oth…
Paradoxes in Sequential Voting
Oren Dean, Yakov Babichenko, Moshe Tennenholtz
We analyse strategic, complete information, sequential voting with ordinal preferences over the alternatives. We consider several voting mechanisms: plurality voting and approval v…
Sequential Voting with Confirmation Network
Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
We discuss voting scenarios in which the set of voters (agents) and the set of alternatives are the same; that is, voters select a single representative from among themselves. Such…
Incentive-Compatible Diffusion
Yakov Babichenko, Oren Dean, Moshe Tennenholtz
Our work bridges the literature on incentive-compatible mechanism design and the literature on diffusion algorithms. We introduce the study of finding an incentive-compatible (stra…