14 citations · 28 across the 17 of their papers we have counts for
27 papers
Computational complexity of -stable matchings
Haris Aziz, Gergely Csáji, Ágnes Cseh
We study deviations by a group of agents in the three main types of matching markets: the house allocation, the marriage, and the roommates models. For a given instance, we call a…
The Swiss Gambit
Ágnes Cseh, Pascal Führlich, Pascal Lenzner
In each round of a Swiss-system tournament, players of similar score are paired against each other. An intentional early loss therefore might lead to weaker opponents in later roun…
Envy-freeness in 3D Hedonic Games
Michael McKay, Ágnes Cseh, David Manlove
We study the problem of partitioning a set of agents into coalitions based on the agents' additively separable preferences, which can also be viewed as a hedonic game. We apply thr…
Maximum-utility popular matchings with bounded instability
Ildikó Schlotter, Ágnes Cseh
In a graph where vertices have preferences over their neighbors, a matching is called popular if it does not lose a head-to-head election against any other matching when the vertic…
Improving Ranking Quality and Fairness in Swiss-System Chess Tournaments
Pascal Sauer, Ágnes Cseh, Pascal Lenzner
The International Chess Federation (FIDE) imposes a voluminous and complex set of player pairing criteria in Swiss-system chess tournaments and endorses computer programs that are…
Popular matchings with weighted voters
Klaus Heeger, Ágnes Cseh
In the Popular Matching problem, we are given a bipartite graph and for each vertex , strict preferences over the neighbors of . Given two matc…