23 citations · 49 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Meltdown
Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss +7
The security of computer systems fundamentally relies on memory isolation, e.g., kernel address ranges are marked as non-accessible and are protected from user access. In this pape…
Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss +7
Modern processors use branch prediction and speculative execution to maximize performance. For example, if the destination of a branch depends on a memory value that is in the proc…
Automated Detection, Exploitation, and Elimination of Double-Fetch Bugs using Modern CPU Features
Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp +4
Double-fetch bugs are a special type of race condition, where an unprivileged execution thread is able to change a memory location between the time-of-check and time-of-use of a pr…
Another Flip in the Wall of Rowhammer Defenses
Daniel Gruss, Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz +5
The Rowhammer bug allows unauthorized modification of bits in DRAM cells from unprivileged software, enabling powerful privilege-escalation attacks. Sophisticated Rowhammer counter…
Relaxation-limited electronic currents in extended reservoir simulations
Daniel Gruss, Alex Smolyanitsky, Michael Zwolak
Open-system approaches are gaining traction in the simulation of charge transport in nanoscale and molecular electronic devices. In particular, "extended reservoir" simulations, wh…
KeyDrown: Eliminating Keystroke Timing Side-Channel Attacks
Michael Schwarz, Moritz Lipp, Daniel Gruss +4
Besides cryptographic secrets, side-channel attacks also leak sensitive user input. The most accurate attacks exploit cache timings or interrupt information to monitor keystroke ti…