34 citations · 91 across the 18 of their papers we have counts for
20 papers
Physical Side-Channel Attacks on Edge LLMs: Extracting Output Tokens and User Prompts
Najeh Alhalawani, Gunes Acar, Zhuoran Liu +1
The deployment of large language models (LLMs) on edge devices is largely motivated by privacy concerns over sharing sensitive user data with cloud servers. In this paper, we demon…
Vogls: a Fast Interactive Full-timing Simulator for Pre-silicon Power Side-Channel Analysis
Gijs Burghoorn, Ileana Buhan, Lejla Batina
Designing hardware circuits resistant to side-channel attacks increasingly relies on simulation to predict device leakage before fabrication. Current functional verification simula…
Triggering Stealthy Feature Map Backdoors via Physical Fault Injection in Embedded Neural Networks
Steyn Hommes, Vincent Dankbaar, Tanguy Stekke +6
Fault injection (FI) attacks on embedded neural network (NN) implementations primarily focus on inducing misclassification by corrupting weights or intermediate computations, overl…
Kraken: Higher-order EM Side-Channel Attacks on DNNs in Near and Far Field
Peter Horvath, Ilia Shumailov, Lukasz Chmielewski +2
The multi-million dollar investment required for modern machine learning (ML) has made large ML models a prime target for theft. In response, the field of model stealing has emerge…
Emerging Threats and Countermeasures in Neuromorphic Systems: A Survey
Pablo Sorrentino, Stjepan Picek, Ihsen Alouani +5
Neuromorphic computing mimics brain-inspired mechanisms through spiking neurons and energy-efficient processing, offering a pathway to efficient in-memory computing (IMC). However,…
Real-world Edge Neural Network Implementations Leak Private Interactions Through Physical Side Channel
Zhuoran Liu, Senna van Hoek, Péter Horváth +3
Neural networks have become a fundamental component of numerous practical applications, and their implementations, which are often accelerated by hardware, are integrated into all…
CNN architecture extraction on edge GPU
Peter Horvath, Lukasz Chmielewski, Leo Weissbart +2
Neural networks have become popular due to their versatility and state-of-the-art results in many applications, such as image classification, natural language processing, speech re…
BarraCUDA: Edge GPUs do Leak DNN Weights
Peter Horvath, Lukasz Chmielewski, Leo Weissbart +2
Over the last decade, applications of neural networks (NNs) have spread to various aspects of our lives. A large number of companies base their businesses on building products that…
Playing with blocks: Toward re-usable deep learning models for side-channel profiled attacks
Servio Paguada, Lejla Batina, Ileana Buhan +1
This paper introduces a deep learning modular network for side-channel analysis. Our deep learning approach features the capability to exchange part of it (modules) with others net…
Breaking a fully Balanced ASIC Coprocessor Implementing Complete Addition Formulas on Weierstrass Elliptic Curves
Ievgen Kabin, Zoya Dyka, Dan Klann +3
In this paper we report on the results of selected horizontal SCA attacks against two open-source designs that implement hardware accelerators for elliptic curve cryptography. Both…
Being Patient and Persistent: Optimizing An Early Stopping Strategy for Deep Learning in Profiled Attacks
Servio Paguada, Lejla Batina, Ileana Buhan +1
The absence of an algorithm that effectively monitors deep learning models used in side-channel attacks increases the difficulty of evaluation. If the attack is unsuccessful, the q…
Keep It Unbiased: A Comparison Between Estimation of Distribution Algorithms and Deep Learning for Human Interaction-Free Side-Channel Analysis
Unai Rioja, Lejla Batina, Igor Armendariz +1
Evaluating side-channel analysis (SCA) security is a complex process, involving applying several techniques whose success depends on human engineering. Therefore, it is crucial to…
Rosita++: Automatic Higher-Order Leakage Elimination from Cryptographic Code
Madura A. Shelton, Łukasz Chmielewski, Niels Samwel +3
Side-channel attacks are a major threat to the security of cryptographic implementations, particularly for small devices that are under the physical control of the adversary. While…
SoK: Design Tools for Side-Channel-Aware Implementations
Ileana Buhan, Lejla Batina, Yuval Yarom +1
Side-channel attacks that leak sensitive information through a computing device's interaction with its physical environment have proven to be a severe threat to devices' security,…
Auto-tune POIs: Estimation of distribution algorithms for efficient side-channel analysis
Unai Rioja, Lejla Batina, Jose Luis Flores +1
Due to the constant increase and versatility of IoT devices that should keep sensitive information private, Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks on embedded devices are gaining visi…
Screen Gleaning: A Screen Reading TEMPEST Attack on Mobile Devices Exploiting an Electromagnetic Side Channel
Zhuoran Liu, Niels Samwel, Léo Weissbart +4
We introduce screen gleaning, a TEMPEST attack in which the screen of a mobile device is read without a visual line of sight, revealing sensitive information displayed on the phone…
The uncertainty of Side-Channel Analysis: A way to leverage from heuristics
Unai Rioja, Servio Paguada, Lejla Batina +1
Performing a comprehensive side-channel analysis evaluation of small embedded devices is a process known for its variability and complexity. In real-world experimental setups, the…
Rosita: Towards Automatic Elimination of Power-Analysis Leakage in Ciphers
Madura A Shelton, Niels Samwel, Lejla Batina +3
Since their introduction over two decades ago, side-channel attacks have presented a serious security threat. While many ciphers' implementations employ masking techniques to prote…
CSI Neural Network: Using Side-channels to Recover Your Artificial Neural Network Information
Lejla Batina, Shivam Bhasin, Dirmanto Jap +1
Machine learning has become mainstream across industries. Numerous examples proved the validity of it for security applications. In this work, we investigate how to reverse enginee…
Kummer: efficient hyperelliptic signatures and key exchange on microcontrollers
Joost Renes, Peter Schwabe, Benjamin Smith +1
We describe the design and implementation of efficient signature and key-exchange schemes for the AVR ATmega and ARM Cortex M0 microcontrollers, targeting the 128-bit security leve…