activity
20102026
most citedBudget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian

44 citations · 199 across the 31 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

34 papers

cs.DS2026

Beating One Half for Online Bipartite Matching with Reusable Resources

Xiaohui Bei, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Wenhao Wu

We study online bipartite matching with unit-inventory reusable resources, where requests arrive in an adversarially fixed order, and each use of a resource makes it unavailable fo…

cs.GT2026

The Power of Simple Mechanisms: A Tight -Approximation for Gains from Trade in Matching Markets

Xiaohui Bei, Wenhao Wu, Shengwei Zhou

We study how well simple mechanisms approximate gains from trade (GFT) in two-sided matching markets with independent buyer values and seller costs, where feasible outcomes form an…

cs.GT2026

Non-Existence of PMMS Allocations and a -PMMS Guarantee for Additive Chores

Xiaohui Bei, Zehan Lin, Shengxin Liu +2

We study pairwise maximin share (PMMS) fairness for indivisible items with additive preferences. We give a polynomial-time reduction from chores to goods that preserves the existen…

cs.GT2026

Individual Fairness in Budget Aggregation

Xiaohui Bei, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger +3

We consider the problem of aggregating individual distributions over alternatives into a collective distribution, also known as budget aggregation. Existing fairness notion…

cs.GT2026

Fair Division by Contribution: A Shapley Value Perspective

Xiaohui Bei, Pinyan Lu, Xiaowei Wu +1

In many resource allocation problems, agents' valuations are best interpreted not as subjective preferences, but as the value they generate from receiving resources. Such valuation…

cs.GT2026

EconCSLib: A Lean Library for Computational Economics and AI-Assisted Research

Xiaohui Bei, Jiajun Ma, Zhan Jing +2

Mathematical formalization uses interactive theorem provers to turn informal mathematical statements into machine-checkable artifacts. The success of mathlib, a large collaborative…