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20152026
most citedSpectral Properties of Hypergraph Laplacian and Approximation Algorithms

17 citations · 95 across the 34 of their papers we have counts for

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10 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

Incentives for Early Arrival in Cost Sharing

Junyu Zhang, Yao Zhang, Yaoxin Ge +4

In cooperative games, we study how values created or costs incurred by a coalition are shared among the members within it, and the players may join the coalition in a online manner…

cs.GT2024

Choosing Behind the Veil: Tight Bounds for Identity-Blind Online Algorithms

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Zhihao Gavin Tang

In Bayesian online settings, every element has a value that is drawn from a known underlying distribution, which we refer to as the element's identity. The elements arrive sequenti…

cs.GT2022

Bidder Subset Selection Problem in Auction Design

Xiaohui Bei, Nick Gravin, Pinyan Lu +1

Motivated by practical concerns in the online advertising industry, we study a bidder subset selection problem in single-item auctions. In this problem, a large pool of candidate b…

cs.GT2022★ 1 cited

Lookahead Auctions with Pooling

Almog Wald, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin +1

A Lookahead Auction (LA), introduced by Ronen, is an auction format for the sale of a single item among multiple buyers, which is considered simpler and more fair than the optimal…

cs.GT2022

"Who Is Next in Line?'' On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings

Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin +1

We introduce a new measure for the performance of online algorithms in Bayesian settings, where the input is drawn from a known prior, but the realizations are revealed one-by-one…

cs.GT2019★ 9 cited

Generalizing Complex Hypotheses on Product Distributions: Auctions, Prophet Inequalities, and Pandora's Problem

Chenghao Guo, Zhiyi Huang, Zhihao Gavin Tang +1

This paper explores a theory of generalization for learning problems on product distributions, complementing the existing learning theories in the sense that it does not rely on an…

cs.GT2018★ 2 cited

Tight Approximation Ratio of Anonymous Pricing

Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Qi Qi +2

We consider two canonical Bayesian mechanism design settings. In the single-item setting, we prove tight approximation ratio for anonymous pricing: compared with Myerson Auction, i…

cs.GT2018★ 14 cited

Tight Revenue Gaps among Simple Mechanisms

Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Zhihao Gavin Tang +1

We consider a fundamental problem in microeconomics: selling a single item to a number of potential buyers, whose values are drawn from known independent and regular (not necessari…

cs.GT2018

Monopoly pricing with buyer search

Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang

In many shopping scenarios, e.g., in online shopping, customers have a large menu of options to choose from. However, most of the buyers do not browse all the options and make deci…

cs.GT2017★ 3 cited

The Value of Information Concealment

Hu Fu, Chris Liaw, Pinyan Lu +1

We consider a revenue optimizing seller selling a single item to a buyer, on whose private value the seller has a noisy signal. We show that, when the signal is kept private, arbit…