activity
20162024
most citedMechanism Design for Facility Location Games with Candidate Locations

2 citations · 3 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

7 papers

cs.GT2024

When does additional information lead to longer travel time in multi-origin-destination networks?

Xujin Chen, Xiaodong Hu, Xinqi Jing +1

The Informational Braess' Paradox (IBP) illustrates a counterintuitive scenario where revelation of additional roadway segments to some self-interested travelers leads to increased…

cs.GT2020★ 2 cited

Mechanism Design for Facility Location Games with Candidate Locations

Zhongzheng Tang, Chenhao Wang, Mengqi Zhang +1

We study the facility location games with candidate locations from a mechanism design perspective. Suppose there are n agents located in a metric space whose locations are their pr…

cs.GT2020★ 1 cited

Price of Fairness in Budget Division for Egalitarian Social Welfare

Zhongzheng Tang, Chenhao Wang, Mengqi Zhang

We study a participatory budgeting problem of aggregating the preferences of agents and dividing a budget over the projects. A budget division solution is a probability distributio…

math.CO2018

On the feedback number of 3-uniform hypergraph

Zhuo Diao, Zhongzheng Tang

Let be a hypergraph with vertex set and edge set . is a feedback vertex set (FVS) of if has no cycle and denote the mini…

cs.DM2018

Approximation algorithms on cycle covering and clique covering

Zhongzheng Tang, Zhuo Diao

Given a weighted graph with weight . A cycle covering is an edge subset of such that has no cycle. The minimum w…

cs.GT2018

Mechanism Design for Two-Opposite-Facility Location Games with Penalties on Distance

Xujin Chen, Xiaodong Hu, Xiaohua Jia +3

This paper is devoted to the two-opposite-facility location games with a penalty whose amount depends on the distance between the two facilities to be opened by an authority. The t…