activity
20162023
most citedBenchmarking Crimes: An Emerging Threat in Systems Security

20 citations · 71 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

9 papers

cs.OS2023★ 1 cited

Proving the Absence of Microarchitectural Timing Channels

Scott Buckley, Robert Sison, Nils Wistoff +4

Microarchitectural timing channels are a major threat to computer security. A set of OS mechanisms called time protection was recently proposed as a principled way of preventing in…

cs.CR2022★ 13 cited

Systematic Prevention of On-Core Timing Channels by Full Temporal Partitioning

Nils Wistoff, Moritz Schneider, Frank K. Gürkaynak +2

Microarchitectural timing channels enable unwanted information flow across security boundaries, violating fundamental security assumptions. They leverage timing variations of sever…

cs.CR2020★ 11 cited

Prevention of Microarchitectural Covert Channels on an Open-Source 64-bit RISC-V Core

Nils Wistoff, Moritz Schneider, Frank K. Gürkaynak +2

Covert channels enable information leakage across security boundaries of the operating system. Microarchitectural covert channels exploit changes in execution timing resulting from…

cs.OS2019

Can We Prove Time Protection?

Gernot Heiser, Gerwin Klein, Toby Murray

Timing channels are a significant and growing security threat in computer systems, with no established solution. We have recently argued that the OS must provide time protection, i…

cs.OS2018★ 8 cited

Time Protection: the Missing OS Abstraction

Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, Tom Chothia +1

Timing channels enable data leakage that threatens the security of computer systems, from cloud platforms to smartphones and browsers executing untrusted third-party code. Preventi…

cs.CR2018★ 20 cited

Benchmarking Crimes: An Emerging Threat in Systems Security

Erik van der Kouwe, Dennis Andriesse, Herbert Bos +2

Properly benchmarking a system is a difficult and intricate task. Unfortunately, even a seemingly innocuous benchmarking mistake can compromise the guarantees provided by a given s…

cs.CR2016★ 12 cited

Your Processor Leaks Information - and There's Nothing You Can Do About It

Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, Frank Li +1

Timing channels are information flows, encoded in the relative timing of events, that bypass the system's protection mechanisms. Any microarchitectural state that depends on execut…

cs.OS2016★ 4 cited

An Evaluation of Coarse-Grained Locking for Multicore Microkernels

Kevin Elphinstone, Amirreza Zarrabi, Adrian Danis +2

The trade-off between coarse- and fine-grained locking is a well understood issue in operating systems. Coarse-grained locking provides lower overhead under low contention, fine-gr…

cs.OS2016★ 2 cited

It's Time: OS Mechanisms for Enforcing Asymmetric Temporal Integrity

Anna Lyons, Gernot Heiser

Mixed-criticality systems combine real-time components of different levels of criticality, i.e. severity of failure, on the same processor, in order to obtain good resource utilisa…