activity
20132025
most citedMathematical models for stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists

102 citations · 154 across the 25 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing 2016Show all

5 papers · 1 filter

cs.DS2016★ 21 cited

Position-Indexed Formulations for Kidney Exchange

John P. Dickerson, David F. Manlove, Benjamin Plaut +2

A kidney exchange is an organized barter market where patients in need of a kidney swap willing but incompatible donors. Determining an optimal set of exchanges is theoretically an…

cs.DM2016★ 3 cited

The Stable Roommates problem with short lists

Ágnes Cseh, Robert W. Irving, David F. Manlove

We consider two variants of the classical Stable Roommates problem with Incomplete (but strictly ordered) preference lists SRI that are degree constrained, i.e., preference lists a…

cs.GT2016★ 4 cited

Preference Elicitation in Matching Markets via Interviews: A Study of Offline Benchmarks

Baharak Rastegari, Paul Goldberg, David Manlove

The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alt…

cs.DS2016

Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites

Katarina Cechlarova, Bettina Klaus, David F. Manlove

We consider the problem of allocating applicants to courses, where each applicant has a subset of acceptable courses that she ranks in strict order of preference. Each applicant an…

cs.DS2016

"Almost-stable" matchings in the Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples

David F. Manlove, Iain McBride, James Trimble

The Hospitals / Residents problem with Couples (HRC) models the allocation of intending junior doctors to hospitals where couples are allowed to submit joint preference lists over…