95 citations · 271 across the 29 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers · 1 filter
The Dichotomous Affiliate Stable Matching Problem: Approval-Based Matching with Applicant-Employer Relations
Marina Knittel, Samuel Dooley, John P. Dickerson
While the stable marriage problem and its variants model a vast range of matching markets, they fail to capture complex agent relationships, such as the affiliation of applicants a…
Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions
Michael Curry, Tuomas Sandholm, John Dickerson
A recent approach to automated mechanism design, differentiable economics, represents auctions by rich function approximators and optimizes their performance by gradient descent. T…
Learning Revenue-Maximizing Auctions With Differentiable Matching
Michael J. Curry, Uro Lyi, Tom Goldstein +1
We propose a new architecture to approximately learn incentive compatible, revenue-maximizing auctions from sampled valuations. Our architecture uses the Sinkhorn algorithm to perf…
PreferenceNet: Encoding Human Preferences in Auction Design with Deep Learning
Neehar Peri, Michael J. Curry, Samuel Dooley +1
The design of optimal auctions is a problem of interest in economics, game theory and computer science. Despite decades of effort, strategyproof, revenue-maximizing auction designs…
Optimal Kidney Exchange with Immunosuppressants
Haris Aziz, Agnes Cseh, John P. Dickerson +1
Algorithms for exchange of kidneys is one of the key successful applications in market design, artificial intelligence, and operations research. Potent immunosuppressant drugs supp…
ProportionNet: Balancing Fairness and Revenue for Auction Design with Deep Learning
Kevin Kuo, Anthony Ostuni, Elizabeth Horishny +5
The design of revenue-maximizing auctions with strong incentive guarantees is a core concern of economic theory. Computational auctions enable online advertising, sourcing, spectru…