activity
20162023
most citedWhat Drives People's Choices in Turn-Taking Games, if not Game-Theoretic Rationality?

6 citations · 13 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

6 papers

cs.LO2023★ 1 cited

On simple expectations and observations of intelligent agents: A complexity study

Sourav Chakraborty, Avijeet Ghosh, Sujata Ghosh +1

Public observation logic (POL) reasons about agent expectations and agent observations in various real world situations. The expectations of agents take shape based on certain prot…

cs.LO2022★ 1 cited

On verifying expectations and observations of intelligent agents

Sourav Chakraborty, Avijeet Ghosh, Sujata Ghosh +1

Public observation logic (POL) is a variant of dynamic epistemic logic to reason about agent expectations and agent observations. Agents have certain expectations, regarding the si…

cs.LO2021

On link deletion and point deletion in games on graphs

Sujata Ghosh, Shreyas Gupta, Lei Li

We discuss link and point deletion operators on graph games and provide a comparative logic-algorithmic study of the same. In particular, we focus on a popular notion of invariance…

cs.GT2017★ 6 cited

What Drives People's Choices in Turn-Taking Games, if not Game-Theoretic Rationality?

Sujata Ghosh, Aviad Heifetz, Rineke Verbrugge +1

In an earlier experiment, participants played a perfect information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right at the…

cs.LO2017★ 1 cited

Proceedings of the Ninth Workshop on Methods for Modalities

Sujata Ghosh, R. Ramanujam

Methods for Modalities is a series aimed at bringing together researchers interested in developing proof methods, verification methods, algorithms and tools based on modal logic. H…

cs.GT2016★ 4 cited

Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?

Sujata Ghosh, Aviad Heifetz, Rineke Verbrugge

We conducted an experiment where participants played a perfect-information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right…