12 citations · 26 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers · 1 filter
Computing Stable Matchings under Complementarities and Preference Misalignment
Tatsuya Iwase, Baharak Rastegari, Bahar Rastegari +2
We study many-to-one, two-sided stable matching problems in which preferences are complementary and firms and workers may rank the same allocation differently. Here a coalition is…
Social Welfare Maximization in Approval-Based Committee Voting under Uncertainty
Haris Aziz, Yuhang Guo, Venkateswara Rao Kagita +2
Approval voting is widely used for making multi-winner voting decisions. The canonical rule (also called Approval Voting) used in the setting aims to maximize social welfare by sel…
Approval-Based Committee Voting under Uncertainty
Hariz Aziz, Venkateswara Rao Kagita, Baharak Rastegari +1
We study approval-based committee voting in which a target number of candidates are selected based on voters' approval preferences over candidates. In contrast to most of the work,…
Solving Hard Stable Matching Problems Involving Groups of Similar Agents
Kitty Meeks, Baharak Rastegari
Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of i…
Pareto Optimal Allocation under Uncertain Preferences
Haris Aziz, Ronald de Haan, Baharak Rastegari
The assignment problem is one of the most well-studied settings in social choice, matching, and discrete allocation. We consider the problem with the additional feature that agents…
Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences
Haris Aziz, Péter Biró, Serge Gaspers +3
We consider the two-sided stable matching setting in which there may be uncertainty about the agents' preferences due to limited information or communication. We consider three mod…
Preference Elicitation in Matching Markets via Interviews: A Study of Offline Benchmarks
Baharak Rastegari, Paul Goldberg, David Manlove
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alt…
Pareto Optimal Matchings in Many-to-Many Markets with Ties
Katarína Cechlárová, Pavlos Eirinakis, Tamás Fleiner +5
We consider Pareto-optimal matchings (POMs) in a many-to-many market of applicants and courses where applicants have preferences, which may include ties, over individual courses an…
Size versus truthfulness in the House Allocation problem
Piotr Krysta, David Manlove, Baharak Rastegari +1
We study the House Allocation problem (also known as the Assignment problem), i.e., the problem of allocating a set of objects among a set of agents, where each agent has ordinal p…