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cs.GT2016
A Note on Relaxation and Rounding in Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Salman Fadaei
In this note, we revisit the \emph{relaxation and rounding} technique employed several times in algorithmic mechanism design. We try to introduce a general framework which covers t…
cs.GT2016★ 2 cited
Generalized Assignment Problem: Truthful Mechanism Design without Money
Salman Fadaei, Martin Bichler
In this paper, we study a problem of truthful mechanism design for a strategic variant of the generalized assignment problem (GAP) in a both payment-free and prior-free environment…
cs.GT2016
Truthfulness with Value-Maximizing Bidders
Salman Fadaei, Martin Bichler
In markets such as digital advertising auctions, bidders want to maximize value rather than payoff. This is different to the utility functions typically assumed in auction theory a…