45 citations · 204 across the 40 of their papers we have counts for
17 papers · 1 filter
Non-Exclusive Notifications for Ride-Hailing at Lyft II: Simulations and Marketplace Analysis
Farbod Ekbatani, Rad Niazadeh, Mehdi Golari +10
Ride-hailing platforms increasingly face uncertain driver acceptance, which makes traditional one-to-one \emph{exclusive dispatch} (ED) less efficient: rejections and timeouts forc…
Stationary Online Contention Resolution Schemes: Theory and Applications to Bayesian Online Resource Allocation
Mohammad Reza Aminian, Rad Niazadeh, Pranav Nuti
Motivated by problems in Bayesian reusable resource allocation, we introduce the concept of stationary online contention resolution schemes (S-OCRSs). OCRSs are a central tool used…
Descending Price Auctions with Bounded Number of Price Levels and Batched Prophet Inequality
Saeed Alaei, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian +1
We consider descending price auctions for selling units of a good to unit demand i.i.d. buyers where there is an exogenous bound of on the number of price levels the auctio…
Fair Dynamic Rationing
Vahideh Manshadi, Rad Niazadeh, Scott Rodilitz
We study the allocative challenges that governmental and nonprofit organizations face when tasked with equitable and efficient rationing of a social good among agents whose needs (…
Stateful Posted Pricing with Vanishing Regret via Dynamic Deterministic Markov Decision Processes
Yuval Emek, Ron Lavi, Rad Niazadeh +1
In this paper, a rather general online problem called dynamic resource allocation with capacity constraints (DRACC) is introduced and studied in the realm of posted price mechanism…
Sequential Submodular Maximization and Applications to Ranking an Assortment of Products
Arash Asadpour, Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi +1
We study a submodular maximization problem motivated by applications in online retail. A platform displays a list of products to a user in response to a search query. The user insp…
Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality
Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas +1
Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular, the dual perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and a…
Linear Programming Based Near-Optimal Pricing for Laminar Bayesian Online Selection
Nima Anari, Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi +1
The Bayesian online selection problem aims to design a pricing scheme for a sequence of arriving buyers that maximizes the expected social welfare (or revenue) subject to different…
Multi-scale Online Learning and its Applications to Online Auctions
Sébastien Bubeck, Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang +1
We consider revenue maximization in online auction/pricing problems. A seller sells an identical item in each period to a new buyer, or a new set of buyers. For the online posted p…
Bernoulli Factories and Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design
Shaddin Dughmi, Jason Hartline, Robert Kleinberg +1
We provide a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our…
Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling
Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil Devanur, Janardhan Kulkarni +1
We consider a scheduling problem where a cloud service provider has multiple units of a resource available over time. Selfish clients submit jobs, each with an arrival time, deadli…
GSP - The Cinderella of Mechanism Design
Christopher A. Wilkens, Ruggiero Cavallo, Rad Niazadeh
Nearly fifteen years ago, Google unveiled the generalized second price (GSP) auction. By all theoretical accounts including their own [Varian 14], this was the wrong auction --- th…
Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions
Rad Niazadeh, Jason Hartline, Nicole Immorlica +2
Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web ad…
Mechanism Design for Value Maximizers
Christopher A Wilkens, Ruggiero Cavallo, Rad Niazadeh +1
In many settings, money is a tool of exchange with minimal inherent utility --- agents will spend it in a way that maximizes the value of goods received subject to reasonable const…
Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders in Combinatorial Auctions
Rad Niazadeh, Christopher Wilkens
Quasiliearity is a ubiquitous and questionable assumption in the standard study of Walrasian equilibria. Quasilinearity implies that a buyer's value for goods purchased in a Walras…
Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing
Saeed Alaei, Jason Hartline, Rad Niazadeh +2
For selling a single item to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values, the revenue optimal auction is complex. With respect to it, Hartline and Roughgarden (2…
Simple and Near-Optimal Mechanisms For Market Intermediation
Rad Niazadeh, Yang Yuan, Robert D. Kleinberg
A prevalent market structure in the Internet economy consists of buyers and sellers connected by a platform (such as Amazon or eBay) that acts as an intermediary and keeps a share…