11 citations · 32 across the 21 of their papers we have counts for
16 papers · 1 filter
Online Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur +1
We introduce and study an online variant of the multi-agent contract model. In our model, agents arrive one-by-one and are active with a certain probability. Upon arrival of agent…
Black-Box Lifting and Robustness Theorems for Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
Multi-agent contract design has largely evaluated contracts through the lens of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). This focus, however, is not without loss: In general, the principal can…
Online Combinatorial Allocations and Auctions with Few Samples
Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier +2
In online combinatorial allocations/auctions, n bidders sequentially arrive, each with a combinatorial valuation (such as submodular/XOS) over subsets of m indivisible items. The a…
Sample Complexity of Posted Pricing for a Single Item
Billy Jin, Thomas Kesselheim, Will Ma +1
Selling a single item to self-interested buyers is a fundamental problem in economics, where the two objectives typically considered are welfare maximization and revenue maximi…
Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
Combinatorial contracts are emerging as a key paradigm in algorithmic contract design, paralleling the role of combinatorial auctions in algorithmic mechanism design. In this paper…
Multi-Agent Contracts
Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman +1
We study a natural combinatorial single-principal multi-agent contract design problem, in which a principal motivates a team of agents to exert effort toward a given task. At the h…