30 citations · 69 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation
Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer
We study equilibrium computation with extensive-form correlation in two-player turn-taking stochastic games. Our main results are two-fold: (1) We give an algorithm for computing a…
Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation Constraints
Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer
We consider the problem of planning with participation constraints introduced in [Zhang et al., 2022]. In this problem, a principal chooses actions in a Markov decision process, re…
Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification
Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer
We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced b…
Group Fairness in Committee Selection
Yu Cheng, Zhihao Jiang, Kamesh Munagala +1
In this paper, we study fairness in committee selection problems. We consider a general notion of fairness via stability: A committee is stable if no coalition of voters can deviat…
A Simple Mechanism for a Budget-Constrained Buyer
Yu Cheng, Nick Gravin, Kamesh Munagala +1
We study a classic Bayesian mechanism design setting of monopoly problem for an additive buyer in the presence of budgets. In this setting a monopolist seller with heterogeneou…
On the Distortion of Voting with Multiple Representative Candidates
Yu Cheng, Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe
We study positional voting rules when candidates and voters are embedded in a common metric space, and cardinal preferences are naturally given by distances in the metric space. In…