7 citations · 14 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
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cs.GT2016★ 1 cited
Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids
Stefano Leonardi, Gianpiero Monaco, Piotr Sankowski +1
Motivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study {\em budget feasible mechanisms} where the goal is to procure independent sets from matroids. More specifically, we…
cs.GT2016
Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing in Matching Markets with Budgets
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Qiang Zhang
We study envy-free pricing mechanisms in matching markets with items and budget constrained buyers. Each buyer is interested in a subset of the items on sale, and she appra…
cs.GT2016
Mechanism Design with Exchangeable Allocations
Qiang Zhang
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference,…