7 citations · 14 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids
Stefano Leonardi, Gianpiero Monaco, Piotr Sankowski +1
Motivated by many practical applications, in this paper we study {\em budget feasible mechanisms} where the goal is to procure independent sets from matroids. More specifically, we…
Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing in Matching Markets with Budgets
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Qiang Zhang
We study envy-free pricing mechanisms in matching markets with items and budget constrained buyers. Each buyer is interested in a subset of the items on sale, and she appra…
Mechanism Design with Exchangeable Allocations
Qiang Zhang
We investigate mechanism design without payments when agents have different types of preferences. Contrary to most settings in the literature where agents have the same preference,…
Facility location with double-peaked preference
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Minming Li, Jie Zhang +1
We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being o…
Efficiency of Truthful and Symmetric Mechanisms in One-sided Matching
Marek Adamczyk, Piotr Sankowski, Qiang Zhang
We study the efficiency (in terms of social welfare) of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one-sided matching problems with {\em dichotomous preferences} and {\em normalized von…