activity
20132026
most citedFair Division of Indivisible Goods: Recent Progress and Open Questions

93 citations · 245 across the 42 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

58 papers

cs.GT2026

Computational Aspects of Distortion

Soroush Ebadian, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Mohamad Latifian +1

The distortion framework in social choice theory allows quantifying the efficiency of (randomized) selection of an alternative based on the preferences of a set of agents. We make…

cs.MA2026

The Delegation Dilemma: Economies of Scale, Accountability, and Polycentric Governance

Arin Mukhopadhyay, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Panayiotis Danassis

Many collective-action systems are neither fully decentralized nor fully centralized: agents voluntarily organize into institutions that share organizational costs and delegate dec…

cs.GT2026

Binary -Center under a Hard Threshold with Applications to Delegated Voting

Jakub Dargaj, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Paul W. Goldberg

We study the problem of covering binary strings of the same length, possibly with missing entries, by a fixed number of center strings, such that each input string is within a give…

cs.GT2026

Nash Equilibria in Auctions with Pacing Strategies: Complexity and Inefficiency

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Charalampos Kokkalis, Mohamad Latifian

We introduce and study Auctions with Pacing Strategies (APS) games, a full-information model in which utility-maximizing bidders compete across many simultaneous first-price auctio…

cs.GT2026

Approximate Envy-Free Allocations up to any Goods

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Georgios Kalantzis, Fangxiao Wang

We study the problem of finding approximate envy-free allocations up to any goods (-EFkX), when agents have additive values over goods in a bundle. As our main result, we sh…

cs.GT2026

Proportionality Degree in Participatory Budgeting

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Sreedurga Gogulapati, Georgios Kalantzis

We initiate the study of the proportionality degree for participatory budgeting, with a particular focus on two popular methods: the Method of Equal Shares (MES) and Phragmen's Seq…

cs.GT2026

Efficient Equilibrium Computation in Symmetric First-Price Auctions

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender +1

We study the complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in single-item first-price auctions. We present the first efficient algorithms for the problem, when the bidders' values…

cs.GT2026

A Theoretical Approach to Stablecoin Design via Price Windows

Katherine Molinet, Aris Filos-Ratsikas

In this paper, we explore the short- and long-term stability of backed stablecoins offering constant mint and redeem prices to all agents. We refer to such designs as price window-…

cs.GT2026

The Distortion of Stable Matching

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Georgios Kalantzis

We initiate the study of distortion in stable matching. Concretely, we aim to design algorithms that have limited access to the agents' cardinal preferences and compute stable matc…

cs.GT2026

Approximate-EFX Allocations with Ordinal and Limited Cardinal Information

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Georgios Kalantzis, Alexandros A. Voudouris

We study a discrete fair division problem where agents have additive valuation functions over a set of goods. We focus on the well-known -EFX fairness criterion, accordi…

cs.GT2025

Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender +1

We consider the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions, where the bidders' values for the item are drawn from a general (possibly corre…

cs.GT2025

Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Georgios Kalantzis, Alexandros A. Voudouris

We study the utilitarian distortion of social choice mechanisms under the recently proposed learning-augmented framework where some (possibly unreliable) predicted information abou…

cs.GT2025

Optimal Metric Distortion for Matching on the Line

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian +2

We study the distortion of one-sided and two-sided matching problems on the line. In the one-sided case, agents need to be matched to items, and each agent's cost in a matc…

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

Pushing the Frontier on Approximate EFX Allocations

Georgios Amanatidis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alkmini Sgouritsa

We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of agents with additive valuation functions, aiming to achieve approximate envy-freeness up to any good (-…

cs.GT2024

On the Computation of Equilibria in Discrete First-Price Auctions

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender +1

We study the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions with discrete value distributions and discrete bidding space, under general subject…

cs.GT2023

PPAD-membership for Problems with Exact Rational Solutions: A General Approach via Convex Optimization

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Kasper Høgh +1

We introduce a general technique for proving membership of search problems with exact rational solutions in PPAD, one of the most well-known classes containing total search problem…

cs.GT2023

On the Potential and Limitations of Proxy Voting: Delegation with Incomplete Votes

Georgios Amanatidis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Philip Lazos +2

We study elections where voters are faced with the challenge of expressing preferences over an extreme number of issues under consideration. This is largely motivated by emerging b…

cs.GT2023

Truthful Interval Covering

Argyrios Deligkas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris

We initiate the study of a novel problem in mechanism design without money, which we term Truthful Interval Covering (TIC). An instance of TIC consists of a set of agents each asso…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

Improved Metric Distortion via Threshold Approvals

Elliot Anshelevich, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Christopher Jerrett +1

We consider a social choice setting in which agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space, and the cost of an agent for an alternative is the distance betwee…

cs.GT2023

Revisiting the Distortion of Distributed Voting

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros A. Voudouris

We consider a setting with agents that have preferences over alternatives and are partitioned into disjoint districts. The goal is to choose one alternative as the winner using a m…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

Settling the Distortion of Distributed Facility Location

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Alexandros A. Voudouris +1

We study the distributed facility location problem, where a set of agents with positions on the line of real numbers are partitioned into disjoint districts, and the goal is to cho…

cs.GT2022★ 93 cited

Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: Recent Progress and Open Questions

Georgios Amanatidis, Haris Aziz, Georgios Birmpas +5

Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since ancient times, with most of the early mathematical work on the problem focusing on resources…

cs.GT2022

Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: A Survey

Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas +1

Allocating resources to individuals in a fair manner has been a topic of interest since the ancient times, with most of the early rigorous mathematical work on the problem focusing…

cs.CC2021★ 5 cited

FIXP-membership via Convex Optimization: Games, Cakes, and Markets

Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Kasper Høgh +1

We introduce a new technique for proving membership of problems in FIXP - the class capturing the complexity of computing a fixed-point of an algebraic circuit. Our technique const…