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20152022
most citedTracking the Trackers: Towards Understanding the Mobile Advertising and Tracking Ecosystem

54 citations · 172 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing cs.CRShow all

8 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2021★ 12 cited

How Great is the Great Firewall? Measuring China's DNS Censorship

Nguyen Phong Hoang, Arian Akhavan Niaki, Jakub Dalek +6

The DNS filtering apparatus of China's Great Firewall (GFW) has evolved considerably over the past two decades. However, most prior studies of China's DNS filtering were performed…

cs.CR2021

Domain Name Encryption Is Not Enough: Privacy Leakage via IP-based Website Fingerprinting

Nguyen Phong Hoang, Arian Akhavan Niaki, Phillipa Gill +1

Although the security benefits of domain name encryption technologies such as DNS over TLS (DoT), DNS over HTTPS (DoH), and Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) are clear, their positive i…

cs.CR2019★ 19 cited

Assessing the Privacy Benefits of Domain Name Encryption

Nguyen Phong Hoang, Arian Akhavan Niaki, Nikita Borisov +2

As Internet users have become more savvy about the potential for their Internet communication to be observed, the use of network traffic encryption technologies (e.g., HTTPS/TLS) i…

cs.CR2019

ICLab: A Global, Longitudinal Internet Censorship Measurement Platform

Arian Akhavan Niaki, Shinyoung Cho, Zachary Weinberg +4

Researchers have studied Internet censorship for nearly as long as attempts to censor contents have taken place. Most studies have however been limited to a short period of time an…

cs.CR2017★ 3 cited

A Churn for the Better: Localizing Censorship using Network-level Path Churn and Network Tomography

Shinyoung Cho, Rishab Nithyanand, Abbas Razaghpanah +1

Recent years have seen the Internet become a key vehicle for citizens around the globe to express political opinions and organize protests. This fact has not gone unnoticed, with c…

cs.CR2016★ 6 cited

Holding all the ASes: Identifying and Circumventing the Pitfalls of AS-aware Tor Client Design

Rishab Nithyanand, Rachee Singh, Shinyoung Cho +1

Traffic correlation attacks to de-anonymize Tor users are possible when an adversary is in a position to observe traffic entering and exiting the Tor network. Recent work has broug…