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20152026
most citedMarket making and incentives design in the presence of a dark pool: a deep reinforcement learning approach

8 citations · 9 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for

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6 papers · 1 filter

math.OC2026

Signature Methods for Optimal Market Making

Alberto Gennaro, Thibaut Mastrolia, Francesca Primavera

We propose a signature-based method to solve the optimal market-making problem under a mean-variance criterion. By exploiting signature linearization techniques, we reduce the mark…

math.OC2026

Approximation of Singular-Stopping Control Driven by Hawkes Processes via Rescaled MDPs

Isabel Agostino, Thibaut Mastrolia

We investigate a singular-optimal stopping stochastic control problem driven by self-exciting dynamics governed by a Hawkes process. In the continuous-time setting, we show that th…

math.OC2025

Agency Problems and Adversarial Bilevel Optimization under Uncertainty and Cyber Threats

Thibaut Mastrolia, Haoze Yan

We study an agency problem between a leader (the principal) seeking to design an optimal incentive scheme to a follower (the agent) to increase the value of a risky project subject…

math.OC2024

Optimal Impulse Control for Cyber Risk Management

Caroline Hillairet, Thibaut Mastrolia, Wissal Sabbagh

We explore an optimal impulse control problem wherein an electronic device owner strategically calibrates protection levels against cyber attacks. Utilizing epidemiological compart…

math.OC2018

Contract theory in a VUCA world

Nicolás Hernández Santibánez, Thibaut Mastrolia

In this paper we investigate a Principal-Agent problem with moral hazard under Knightian uncertainty. We extend the seminal framework of Holmström and Milgrom by combining a Stacke…

math.OC2017

Principal-Agent Problem with Common Agency without Communication

Thibaut Mastrolia, Zhenjie Ren

In this paper, we consider a problem of contract theory in which several Principals hire a common Agent and we study the model in the continuous time setting. We show that optimal…