3 papers
cs.GT2025
Characterizing Off-Chain Influence Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Roughgarden (2020) initiates the study of Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs), and posits that the on-chain game of a ``good'' TFM should be on-chain simple (OnCS), i.e., incentive c…
cs.GT2025
Truthful, Credible, and Optimal Auctions for Matroids via Blockchains and Commitments
Aadityan Ganesh, Qianfan Zhang
We consider a revenue-optimizing auctioneer in single-dimensional environments with matroid feasibility constraints. Akbarpour and Li (2020) argue that any revenue-optimal, truthfu…
cs.GT2024
Revisiting the Primitives of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Aadityan Ganesh, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is considere…