141 citations · 167 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Rationality-Robust Information Design: Bayesian Persuasion under Quantal Response
Yiding Feng, Chien-Ju Ho, Wei Tang
Classic mechanism/information design imposes the assumption that agents are fully rational, meaning each of them always selects the action that maximizes her expected utility. Yet…
Competitive Information Design for Pandora's Box
Bolin Ding, Yiding Feng, Chien-Ju Ho +2
We study a natural competitive-information-design strategic variant for the celebrated Pandora's Box problem (Weitzman, 1979), where each box is associated with a strategic informa…
Incentivizing High Quality Crowdwork
Chien-Ju Ho, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Siddharth Suri +1
We study the causal effects of financial incentives on the quality of crowdwork. We focus on performance-based payments (PBPs), bonus payments awarded to workers for producing high…
Low-Cost Learning via Active Data Procurement
Jacob Abernethy, Yiling Chen, Chien-Ju Ho +1
We design mechanisms for online procurement of data held by strategic agents for machine learning tasks. The challenge is to use past data to actively price future data and give le…