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20132026
most citedThe Fluid Mechanics of Liquid Democracy

39 citations · 63 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for

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6 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2026

Sampford Apportionment Satisfies Threshold Monotonicity

Haris Aziz, Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki

Apportionment distributes a fixed number of legislative seats among political parties in proportion to their vote shares. Randomization can satisfy quota in every realization and e…

cs.GT2026

Anchoring for Truthfulness: The Random-Anchor Volume Mechanism for Multi-Facility Location

Haris Aziz, Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki

We study the strategyproof placement of \(k\) facilities on the real line for \(n\) agents who privately report their locations, without monetary transfers. For two facilities, the…

cs.GT2026

When One Good Is Not Enough: EF1 and Pareto Optimality Are Not Compatible for Submodular Valuations

Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki

One of the central questions in discrete fair division is whether fairness and efficiency can be achieved simultaneously. For indivisible goods, a canonical relaxation of envy-free…

cs.GT2026

Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness for Mixed Goods and Chores

Haris Aziz, Xiaolin Bu, Xinhang Lu +4

We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing indivisible items among agents with additive utilities. In our model, an item can be a good yielding non-negative utilities to s…

cs.GT2026

Optimal Subsidy Bounds for Goods and Chores: One Dollar Each Suffices

Xinhang Lu, Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki

We study the fair allocation of indivisible items to agents with additive utilities. In our setting, each indivisible item may be a good, yielding non-negative utility to s…

cs.GT2026

Counterexamples to EFX for Submodular and Subadditive Valuations

Simon Mackenzie, Mashbat Suzuki

The existence of EFX allocations is a fundamental question in fair division. In this paper, we construct a three-agent, eight-good instance with monotone subadditive valuations suc…