3 citations · 6 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers
Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen +1
We expand the literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous item auctions by considering settings with correlated values; we do this via the fundamental economic model o…
On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets
Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman
We study the power and limits of optimal dynamic pricing in combinatorial markets; i.e., dynamic pricing that leads to optimal social welfare. Previous work by Cohen-Addad et al. […
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat +2
We study combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations. In such settings, each agent has a private signal that captures her private information, and the valuation…
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat +1
We consider a setting where an auctioneer sells a single item to potential agents with {\em interdependent values}. That is, each agent has her own private signal, and the valu…
Prompt Scheduling for Selfish Agents
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat +1
We give a prompt online mechanism for minimizing the sum of [weighted] completion times. This is the first prompt online algorithm for the problem. When such jobs are strategic age…
An Economic-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching
Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat +1
In their seminal paper, Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani (STOC'90) introduce the online bipartite matching problem, and the RANKING algorithm, which admits a tight compe…