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20122021
most citedEnd-to-end verifiability

16 citations · 49 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for

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6 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2018★ 6 cited

Bayesian Tabulation Audits: Explained and Extended

Ronald L. Rivest

Tabulation audits for an election provide statistical evidence that a reported contest outcome is "correct" (meaning that the tabulation of votes was properly performed), or else t…

cs.CR2017

Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Matthew Bernhard, Josh Benaloh, J. Alex Halderman +6

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversa…

cs.CR2017★ 9 cited

ClipAudit: A Simple Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audit

Ronald L. Rivest

We propose a simple risk-limiting audit for elections, ClipAudit. To determine whether candidate A (the reported winner) actually beat candidate B in a plurality election, ClipAudi…

cs.CR2016★ 4 cited

Auditing Australian Senate Ballots

Berj Chilingirian, Zara Perumal, Ronald L. Rivest +6

We explain why the Australian Electoral Commission should perform an audit of the paper Senate ballots against the published preference data files. We suggest four different post-e…

cs.CR2016

An IBE-based Signcryption Scheme for Group Key Management

Peter Gutmann, Steven M. Bellovin, Matt Blaze +2

This paper presents a new crypto scheme whose title promises it to be so boring that no-one will bother reading past the abstract. Because of this, the remainder of the paper is le…

cs.CR2015★ 16 cited

End-to-end verifiability

Josh Benaloh, Ronald Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan +3

This pamphlet describes end-to-end election verifiability (E2E-V) for a nontechnical audience: election officials, public policymakers, and anyone else interested in secure, transp…